AI Guidelines for Business Ver1.1 (provisional English translation)

Claims that cite this source · 9

1. Interpretation· confidence medium· passage checked

   “How societies should” sets the scope wider than a single organisation, where several explicit definitions place governance (Mäntymäki et al., Schneider et al., IAPP, IBM, Japan’s business guidelines). It is closest to Chile’s multi-actor definition of governance and the UN advisory body’s multi-stakeholder framing, and it keeps the question normative: what should be done, not only what is done.

2. Interpretation· confidence medium· passage checked

   “Shape” treats governance as steering rather than assurance. The nearest framings are Japan’s stakeholders designing and operating systems and ECLAC’s measure of the state’s capacity to steer AI deployment; most explicit definitions instead describe instruments that ensure compliance or alignment.

3. Interpretation· confidence medium· passage checked

   None of the definitions compared here lists incentives or infrastructure among what it governs; they govern AI itself, its lifecycle, or an organisation’s use of it. The idea is not new, though: the UN advisory body says governance frameworks should “shape incentives globally”, Japan’s guidelines run agile governance across systems that include infrastructure, and Sastry et al. treat compute as one tool of AI governance. Naming incentives, institutions, infrastructures and safeguards together as the objects of governance is AIGovSpec’s own synthesis.

4. Interpretation· confidence medium· passage checked

   Most definitions aim at risk, compliance, or responsible and ethical use; several of them, by their wording, operate system by system. AIGovSpec aims at harmful patterns. The closest counterparts are UNESCO’s call for anticipation and monitoring of impact and NIST’s view that governance is continual over a system’s lifespan, but neither makes patterns, as distinct from individual risks, the target.

5. Interpretation· confidence medium· passage checked

   Adaptability is common: the OECD, the UN advisory body, Japan, Kenya, the African Union and the World Bank all expect governance to be agile or regularly revised. Acting before arrangements set is rarer. Dafoe urges embedding principles while the stakes are relatively low, and Ojanen et al. draw on Guston’s anticipatory governance (“while effective intervention is still possible”), but none of the definitions compared here builds that timing into the definition of AI governance itself. This is the clause in which AIGovSpec departs most from them.

6. Interpretation· confidence high· passage checked

   The AIGovSpec definition is less operational than organisational definitions such as Mäntymäki et al. or Japan’s business guidelines. It does not say which rules, processes or roles to put in place; in this framework, the tests and diagnostic questions carry that work.

7. Synthesis· confidence high· passage checked

   Of the 29 governmental, intergovernmental and standards documents compared here, only two, Japan’s AI Guidelines for Business and Kenya’s AI strategy, define AI governance in a sentence. Most use the term without defining it, and some laws, including the Council of Europe Convention and Korea’s framework act, do not use it at all.

8. Interpretation· confidence medium· passage checked

   Read in order, the documents move from field-defining scholarship and principles (2017–2021), to organisational management systems and risk functions (2020–2023), to national strategies, laws and standing international bodies (2024–2026). The term spreads faster than any shared definition of it.

9. Interpretation· confidence high· passage checked

   Most recent documents expect governance to adapt, whether described as agile, iterative, living or continually improved, including the OECD, NIST, ISO/IEC 42001, Japan, Kenya, Colorado and Singapore. Far fewer say when governance should act relative to the technology’s spread.